ABSTRACT
This chapter offers an analysis of the development of Husserl’s views on cognition (Erkenntnis) in light of their relation to the broader Kantian tradition of Erkenntnistheorie and “critique of cognition” (Erkenntniskritik). By such a comparative examination, the chapter aims to bring into relief important and often overlooked points of continuity between Husserl and the broadly Kantian position, particularly with respect to Husserl’s grounds for distinguishing perception, cognition, knowledge, and science, and with respect to Husserl’s increasing focus upon the question of the relation of cognition and reason. At the same time, the chapter aims to clarify which aspects of Husserl’s account of cognition diverge from or go beyond the Kantian framework, and uncover Husserl’s motivations for such divergences, not least on the question of the nature of the contributions to cognition made by various species of intuition.
