ABSTRACT
The publication of the two volumes of Logical Investigations at the turn of the twentieth century constituted, according to their author, the first breakthrough of an entirely new and original philosophical undertaking, which gave birth to the phenomenological movement. However, before Husserl’s later attempt to systematize the content and provide a unified interpretation of the methods of phenomenology, the strength of this breakthrough rested mainly on the new, though sometimes divergent, paths of investigation that phenomenology was able to open.
The purpose of this chapter is to present an overview of the main discoveries that gave rise to this phenomenological breakthrough and to provide a faithful account of its original philosophical claims – an account that resists the temptation of projecting onto Logical Investigations as a posteriori interpretation based on a later stage of Husserl’s philosophical thought. The chapter will highlight the tensions inherent to Husserl’s phenomenological project, born from an original attempt to combine the resources of Brentano’s psychology with the logical expectations inherited from Bolzano’s philosophy and Frege’s anti-psychologism. These tensions clearly appear if we pay attention to Husserl’s failed attempts to edit and rewrite the first edition of Logical Investigations after he completed the first volume of Ideas, which provides a transcendental and much more systematic framework for the phenomenological method. The chapter focuses in particular upon the ambiguities of Husserl’s early theory of meaning and points out the transformations of his conception of indexicals (or “essentially occasional expressions”) in order to shed some light on the tensions inherent to Logical Investigations that the transcendental move towards a form of phenomenological idealism was expected to overcome.
