ABSTRACT
Long regarded as a definitive statement of Husserl’s thinking, Ideas I is upon closer inspection as much a work of transition as it is a work caught in transition. Looking backwards as well as forwards, its Janus-faced presentation announces a moment of arrival as well as a point of departure. In this chapter, I examine Husserl’s presentation of his phenomenological critique of reason in Ideas I. As I argue, Husserl understands phenomenology as a theoretical foundation of reason. In Ideas I, Husserl’s aim is forward looking: to motivate the new science of pure phenomenology, to present its signature method and theoretical attitude, and to map its field of investigation – the a priori structures of consciousness configured in terms of intentionality. For Husserl, the radicality of reason consists in a radical openness to what is other than consciousness – real being – without the transcendent character of what is falling outside or beyond the claims of reason, for which reason takes responsibility in self-critique in the name of what it is.
