ABSTRACT
Identifying our mental states’ representational content with their strict informational content is not an attractive option. The most famous disjunction problem is the problem of misrepresentation, where some of the states of affairs included in the long disjunction of strict informational content are misrepresentations – and so should not be included – according to the intuitive content of that representation. One legitimate way to get from the thermometer’s strict informational content to its intuitive representational content would be via the user’s intentional states. According to the asymmetric dependence theory, the content-determining informational relation between a representation and its object is fundamental, in the sense that any other causal or nomic relations between the representation and the world depend on the fundamental nomic relation, but not the other way around. Conceptual role semantics runs into an analogue of one of the principal problems that plagues informational semantics, namely the problem of misrepresentation, or more generally the problem of error.
