ABSTRACT
Cases of inverse akrasia are philosophically puzzling. The challenge is to explain how an action that is carried out on account of a judgment-countervailing emotion, which the agent herself considers is “irrational” at the time of action but eventually comes to believe was, in fact, the best course of action to take, can be described as rational. This chapter takes up this challenge. First, it clarifies the conditions under which cases of inverse akrasia can be described as both akratic and rational. Second, it shows that neither the standard view - according to which akrasia is a paradigm of irrationality - nor recent proposals that attempt to describe cases of inverse akrasia as rational meet these conditions. Third, the analysis leads me to conclude that cases of inverse akrasia are not rational. The particular irrationality of these cases lies in the fact that they do not satisfy diachronic enkrasia, that is, the requirement to reconsider and revise one’s better judgment in the light of new and weightier evidence. The rational thing to do in cases in which an agent experiences emotions that conflict with her better judgment is to meta-reason about them and then reconsider and revise (or reaffirm) them on the basis of all the relevant evidence-based reasons. Finally, the chapter shows how best to carry out meta-reasoning about one’s emotions and confront the objections raised against them.
