ABSTRACT
This chapter examines Dewey’s view of moral knowledge developed in Chapter 14 of the Ethics. I focus more specifically on the role played by sympathy in moral inquiry. While Dewey claims that sympathy is “the general principle of moral knowledge” as well as “the surest way to attain objectivity of moral knowledge,” it has not been the object of any extensive discussion by commentators on Dewey’s ethics. I emphasize the originality of Dewey’s position by contrasting it with that of David Hume, Adam Smith, and John Stuart Mill, who all stressed the fundamental role of sympathy in making moral judgments. Accordingly, I examine their respective answers to the moral problem raised by natural sympathy: how can such a biased and partial psychological mechanism play a beneficial role in the formation of moral judgments, which specifically aim at impartiality and objectivity? I will argue that while Hume, Smith, and Mill choose to simply extend the scope of natural sympathy, Dewey argues in favor of a deeper transformation of natural sympathy: (1) the spontaneous emotional reaction becomes intentional perspective-taking; (2) it loses its function of direct approval or disapproval, and takes on an epistemic function of data-gathering subordinated to moral reasoning.
