ABSTRACT
This chapter proposes a relatively neglected sub-discipline in ethics that we call “exemplarism,” offers a schematic representation of the exemplarity relation, and briefly discusses the nature of the elements of that relation. Notable results emerging from the present discussion are these: In the exemplarity relationship, the excellence that is admired can be not only the virtues, but the basic humanity of the exemplar; thus, not only canonical exemplars like Father Gregory Boyle and Jean Vanier, but also “ordinary” people, can be admired as exemplars. This possibility is especially salient and important where cultural externals obscure the humanity of the potential exemplar. Admiration is the central emotion involved in the exemplarity relation, but not all admiration is virtuous; in particular, some admiration is evil and some mediates the dehumanizing relationship that belongs to the social ethos that Vanier calls “the Normal.” Virtuous admiration presupposes as well as fosters virtues in the admirer; this fact implies that admiration cannot be the unique foundation, either of moral development, or of moral concepts, and calls into question the idea of exemplarism as a general moral theory.
