ABSTRACT
The Crimean War was the result of erroneous assessments of the balance of power in Europe made by Nicholas I. After the second Egyptian crisis of 1839–1841 and the European revolutions of 1848–1849, significant changes in the military power, interests and unions of the Great Powers took place. The confrontation between “the northern monarchies” and the alliance of “maritime countries” ceased to exist and was superseded by new alliances. The idea of Franco-British cooperation lacked support in London, whilst Russian influence in Austria reached its peak. The new balance of power inevitably manifested itself in the Eastern policies of those politicians who considered themselves the heirs of the doctors of the “sick man” of Europe. Nicholas overestimated the strength of his influence in Europe. Neither London nor Paris nor Vienna wanted to see Constantinople and the Straits under Russian control. Nicholas I still hoped that Anglo-French rivalry in the Middle East, especially in Syria and Egypt, would prevent the political unification of London and Paris, and he did not expect hostility from Great Britain. This led Russia into the trap of war. The alliance against Russia was too powerful to be defeated, yet too weak to invade the Russian hinterland.
