ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that the outcome of the Crimean War was ultimately influenced by factors unrelated to the events in the Black Sea. The outcome of the war and the outcome of the siege of Sevastopol had different reasons that should not replace each other. Russian-Austrian and Russian-Prussian bilateral alliances, conventions and mutual obligations concluded in the 1830s worked successfully during the crises of 1839–1841 and 1848–1850. However, they failed during the crisis that began in 1852. The Russian government had underestimated the danger of an Anglo-French and Austro-Prussian rapprochement. The interests of at least four great powers made a decisive revision of the regime of the Black Sea Straits in favour of Russia almost unattainable. Russia lost the war even before the first shot was fired. Achievements of Russian military policy under Emperor Nicholas I could not guarantee Russia's absolute invulnerability. Even the strongest land army on the European continent, which alone could not be challenged by any of the great powers, did not leave Russia a chance of winning the war against a powerful coalition and international isolation. The basis of the Russian Grand Strategy in 1853–1856 was the recognition of the impossibility of winning such a war.
