ABSTRACT

According to the “The Guise of the Good Thesis“, when we act intentionally, we always act under the guise of the good. That is, in ?-ing intentionally, we take ?-ing to be good. There are also similar views in terms of “reasons” instead of “good“, and in most versions of the Guise of the Good Thesis, the thesis also applies to any desire (or motivation) that can be part of the explanation of an intentional action. In such versions, desires also present their objects as good, or they are “experiences of value“. In this chapter, I outline various versions of the Guise of the Good Thesis as well as the motivations for the thesis, together with the arguments that have been presented for and against this view. I argue that, although the Guise of the Good Thesis has faced a number of criticisms recently, it remains a compelling view of desire and intentional action, a view that can be an important part of a unified account of our rational powers of action and knowledge.