ABSTRACT
This chapter explains and expands a view of emotions according to which they play a significant role within practical reasoning rather than just as an alternative to it that is sometimes arguably rational. Emotions direct attention to reasons for action and can augment their normative force. Besides the evidential considerations that justify a judgment, general practical considerations also count among the reasons for attention to the corresponding evaluation, as secured by affect. The assessment of emotions as justified or not focuses on their evaluative content, but for negative emotions such as fear or anger the element of affect, or emotional discomfort, provides a reason to act to falsify the evaluation, in the sense of making it inapplicable by changing the situation. What emotional discomfort adds to an ought judgment, then, is a further reason that is both self regarding and a reason to act soon. Finally, a reconception of practical reasons in terms of criticism shows how negative emotions can serve as barriers to discounting reasons and also yields a fuller account of rational motivation by positive emotions such as joy.
