ABSTRACT
It may seem that there are a number of different oughts. There is a moral ought, there is a prudential ought, and so on. Furthermore, it may seem that each ought is such that one ought to do the best thing one could do, where the sense of best at issue varies with the kind of ought it is. Thus, it seems that morally, a person ought to do the morally best thing she could do, and prudentially, a person ought to do the prudentially best thing she could do. This suggests that the moral ought and the prudential ought often conflict and thus that often, morally, one ought to do something although, prudentially, one ought to refrain from doing it. I will dispute these natural thoughts and offer an alternative view in their place. There is no distinctively moral ought, though there are some ought facts that are distinctively moral. Similarly, there is no distinctively prudential ought, though there are some ought facts that are distinctively prudential. Finally, distinctively moral ought claims never conflict with distinctively prudential ought claims: it is never the case that, morally, one ought to do something, while, prudentially, one ought to refrain.
