ABSTRACT
The Gulf crisis was in many ways a test of Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking." The major global lesson of the Gulf crisis, immediately apparent and increasingly important, was the need to eliminate regional instability if the post-Cold War world order were to be preserved. Criticism of Soviet arms supplies and the nature of Soviet allies in the region, together with the criticism of past Soviet Middle East policy in general, which were all evoked by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, led to criticism over foreign policy decisionmaking altogether. The crisis had a mixed impact on Soviet relations with Middle East states and peoples. The ariti-perestroika camp also argued against supporting the anti-Iraq coalition by invoking the need to placate Soviet Muslim interests. Aside from studying the lessons of the war and the resultant demands of the military for increased attention and investment in arms development, postwar policy debates within the Soviet Union soon abandoned the Middle East subject.
