ABSTRACT
Is it ever permissible to lie or deceive in politics? Can we allow disinformation or malinformation in, say, referenda? The answer will certainly depend on the criterion of permissibility we employ. In this paper, the author will start with what may look like a very strict Kantian criterion, which seems to allow only truthful statements and honest behaviour. He will then examine three limitations to this criterion and, hence, three cases where, in principle, the requirements of truthfulness and honesty do not apply. The first is simply a case of making explicit an implication of the Kantian criterion, which disallows lying or deceitful behaviour, but does not require truthfulness or honesty in every instance. The second is a case of allowing deceptive behaviour, when honesty undermines an epistemic principle of right adjudication in situations of conflict. The third case seems to allow lying statements, where truthfulness would reduce the citizens’ political autonomy. The author argues that, whereas the first two limitations are justified, the third one relies on a circular argument and is ultimately unsupported.
