ABSTRACT
This chapter relies on the recognition of two paradoxes related to the complex and ambivalent relationship between truth and politics in a democracy. The first paradox is generated by contradictory normative perspectives on truth: On one hand, in our political culture, truth is deemed a fundamental requirement in public affairs; on the other hand, truth is perceived as threatening to epistemic and cultural pluralism. The second paradox derives from the following observation: Despite a strong belief that accurate information is a necessary prerequisite to democratic decision-making, social scientists have often stressed the risk of uninformed citizens’ opinions in democratic contexts and have been concerned with the low levels of political knowledge amongst the electorate for a long time. This paradox becomes even more dramatic when surveys show – as they have recently – that citizens are not only uninformed but (also) mis- or disinformed. This leads the author to elaborate on the spectrum of “information disorder” and especially on the distinction between mis- and disinformation. The major claim of the chapter is that the idea, according to which “honest mistakes” (or misinformation) would have only limited effects on the democratic process, has to be qualified. This claim is illustrated by a Swiss popular initiative that took place in 2016.
