ABSTRACT
Cruising for parking is an externality occasioned by an inefficient regulation of curbside parking fees. In the last several years, some cities have implemented new parking policies with the aim to shift non-resident users from the curb to off-street parking spaces and thereby reduce cruising for parking. In this context, this chapter aims to examine the effects of a non-market-oriented parking policy. More concretely, we examine cruising for parking for a specific area of Barcelona’s city where two regulated categories coexist: mixed-use and commercial-use spaces. Our findings point out that cruising for parking is different among the two regulated categories and differs over time depending on the intervals provided by the regulatory framework. Cruising for parking is higher in low parking fee blocks and when fees are off. Also, drivers show anticipatory behavior considering close hourly changes in regulation. In all, our results suggest that regulation is a crucial determinant of cruising for parking.
