ABSTRACT
In the years preceding the independence referendum held in the KRG in September 2017, the relationship between Ankara and Erbil had blossomed, based on commerce, energy exports, a shared antipathy towards Baghdad and towards the PKK, and interlocking interests between the families and business circles surrounding Turkish president Erdogan and KRG president Barzani. Ankara had even appeared relaxed in the face of Barzani’s repeated insistence that an independence referendum would be held. Ankara’s fierce reaction to the holding of the referendum, and in particular to its extension to the disputed territory of Kirkuk, took Erbil by surprise. This article will seek to explain Ankara’s reaction, and Erbil’s failure to anticipate it. It will explore Ankara’s aspirations in northern Iraq, its unease both with developments in Rojava and with the PKK/YPG presence in northern Iraq, its commitment to the Turkmen of Kirkuk, its growing dissatisfaction with Erbil, and shifts in power and perspective in Ankara. It will also seek to unpick Barzani’s decision to go ahead with a referendum. It will then speculate on possible outcomes for the KRG in Iraq, on whether Baghdad can emerge as a viable longer-term partner for Turkey, and on the extent to which Turkey might be prepared to sustain the economic and political losses that could result from a more permanent and substantive loosening of its ties with Erbil.
