ABSTRACT
In 1999, Cabo Verde became the first country in the world to introduce a legislated candidate quota by stipulating that a reward should be given to political parties that manage to meet a threshold of at least 25% women elected to the national assembly. However, the reward mechanism for parties has never been put into effect as the proposed quota was never complemented by the necessary legal provisions that would give it legal force. This chapter contributes to the literature that argues that sanctions for non-compliance are a potentially more effective measure to incentivize behavioural change than rewards for compliance. Based on semi-structured interviews with 48 parliamentarians, candidates, civil servants, representatives of non-government organization and international agents, we found that the reward mechanism ultimately failed because it emerged as a compromise that did not have a strong following either among those who normally mobilize for gender balance in political recruitment or among counter-mobilizers. Although women’s activists rarely advocate for a reward mechanism because of the expected lack of effectiveness in increasing the number of women in politics, this is exactly what makes it acceptable to some quota opponents.
