ABSTRACT
In 1995, Ethiopia adopted a constitution that established a two-tiered dual federal system that is also reflected in the manner that the judiciary is structured. The country has also adopted an unusual model of constitutional review in which the House of Federation, the upper house of the federal Parliament, is given the power to interpret the Constitution, including the exclusive power to resolve disputes between the two levels of government. This chapter discusses the design of the Ethiopian umpire and examine whether the courts and the House of Federation (HoF) have managed to give ‘shape and texture’ to the Ethiopian federal system. The possibility of state courts developing a jurisprudence that speaks to the unique circumstance of their jurisdictions and respective societies is undercut by a Federal Supreme Court whose powers of adjudication are not limited to federal laws and federal matters. By denying state courts the final say on the meaning and scope of state laws, the Constitution and the practice that is based on it has the effect of turning the dual court system into one that is unitary and integrated. Since intergovernmental disputes are beyond the purview of federal and state courts, they have done little to contribute to our understanding of the division of powers and responsibilities between the different levels of governments. The HoF has not also managed to have any meaningful effect on nudging the federation toward centralization or decentralization.
