ABSTRACT
Halák aims to provide an interpretation of experiential learning that fully detaches itself from the epistemological presuppositions of empiricist and intellectualist accounts of learning. He first introduces the concept of schema as understood by Kant and then explains how it is related to the problems implied by the empiricist and intellectualist frameworks. He then interprets David Kolb’s theory of learning that is based on the concept of learning cycle and represents an attempt to overcome the corresponding drawbacks of these frameworks. He shows that Kolb’s theory fails to achieve its goal because it is rooted in some of the fundamental epistemological presuppositions of these frameworks. Subsequently, the chapter presents a group of works from phenomenology, in particular Merleau-Ponty’s, in order to show that Kolb’s attempt is insufficient due to a lack of understanding of the problem expressed by Kant via the concept of schema. Finally, Halák outlines an interpretation of experiential learning as differentiation of experiential schemas and explains how it meets the epistemological challenges outlined above.
