ABSTRACT
Gottlob Frege wanted to capture the idea that things believed are thoughts, the sorts of things that are the senses rather than the references of sentences. For Frege's logical purposes, unlike the distinction between sense and reference, the distinction between sense and coloring could be ignored. But a number of facts conspire to make coloring, whatever it is, more semanticaliy interesting than one might initially suppose. Frege's remarks about coloring, when examined and developed in a larger context, lead very naturally to a theory that allows to junk senses. Neo-Russellians about propositions have suggested individuating propositions in virtue of the objects and properties that are their components; and these entities are simply those that are supplied by a theory of reference. As Frege observes, the case of the connectives 'and' and 'but' seems to have something interesting in common with cases involving pairs of general terms with the same sense.
