ABSTRACT
This chapter presents Herman Cappelen and Ernest Lepore's analysis and their main argument for that analysis. It argues that their analysis fails to express a necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of a mixed quotation if, as Davidson sometimes puts it, samesaying is a synonymy relation between utterances. The chapter argues for the same conclusion while granting Cappelen and Lepore's very plausible claim that samesaying is a pragmatically determined relation. Cappelen and Lepore claim that their account gets the truth-conditions of mixed quotations right. Presumably, their analysis is correct only if it provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of a mixed quotation. If the pragmatic view of samesaying is correct, then it ought to be possible for a true indirect quotation to contain a complement whose tokens samesay the reported utterance but which do not have the same truth-conditions as the reported utterance.
