ABSTRACT
From the 1930s to the early 1950s, the dominant mood in Anglo-American moral philosophy was skepticism. Some philosophers, rather tentatively, began to put forward theories identifying morality with certain natural facts about human beings and human societies. Among the most powerful metaphorical rationales for morality is the metaphor of the contract. Moral principles are viewed as rules everyone could agree to, given individual ends and at least a minimal, basic interest in finding some system of mutually beneficial rules. Theorists in the realist tradition, while denying that moral categories apply to international relations, nevertheless have, with doubtful consistency, put forward very definite ideas about how nations should conduct themselves. National rhetoric bristles with moral fervor and righteous indignation, and nations' behavior, although often more controlled, nevertheless is colored by these attitudes. The scale of the problems, the sophisticated technology, and the role of institutional structures and cultural and ideological conflict make common moral categories somehow irrelevant.
