ABSTRACT
The deterrence dilemma arises from a conflict between intention and possible action. The disarmament dilemma is structurally quite different from the deterrence dilemma and takes a form familiar in the literature of rational choice and also moral philosophy—the form of a Prisoner's Dilemma. The disarmament dilemma arises from a conflict between action and possible outcome. The dilemmas arise out of certain perceptions that nations have of each other and that lead to the fear that one is in danger of being attacked by a power that seeks forcible dominance. In any real case, one must consider how much one improves one's prospect of avoiding attack by adopting a deterrence policy and how undesirable retaliation to an attack would be in comparison with acquiescence. The cost is that the policy creates the possibility of mistaken unilateral disarmament, on the erroneous expectation that the other party will disarm.
