ABSTRACT
Charles Beitz's case for the resource redistribution principle appeals to some distinct Rawlsian arguments that Beitz tends to conflate. Beitz's argument from moral arbitrariness is the only one appropriate to his resource redistribution principle because any plausible contractarianism contends that only the actual or prospective cooperation among agents sets the stage for the elaboration of principles of justice binding among those agents. Thus, the argument from moral arbitrariness, which is the only Rawlsian argument available to Beitz for supporting the resource redistribution principle, provides no plausible basis for that principle. The moral arbitrariness of "the natural distribution" of resources is inferred by Beitz from the denial that advantageous location vindicates entitlements to natural resources, and "redistribution under a resource redistribution principle" is inferred by Beitz from the moral arbitrariness of "the natural distribution". Beitz himself asserts that appropriation of talents is a mere fait accompli while the appropriation of resources is under an agent's "direct control".
