ABSTRACT
The 1984 Panamanian presidential election signaled a milestone in that country’s civil-military relations and a curious paradox. The Guards’ “voluntary disengagement” from direct governance and without considerable pressure from within or without the military, represents a significant challenge to de-intervention theory in the Latin American context. National Guard methods of influence, in and out of power, have been goal-directed toward specific, short-term objectives and achievements. The United States replaced the army with a tiny national police with a complement of only 700 men and an American commander. Direct United States multi-national corporate investment doubled under the military regime and average life expectancy increased while economic growth stabilized at a healthy rate. There are four dimensions of the professionalization process important for understanding the 1968 intervention. These are: the growth in social status and political influence of the Guard, the ambivalence of ties to the United States, the advent of “military radicalism” and changes in military command structure and political capacity.
