ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on the way in which fundamental divergence in role conceptions affected United States (US)-Indian relations. It explores the inferences that Indian decisionmakers drew from some episodes and shows how they collectively contributed to a decline in relations between India and the US During the Lyndon Johnson administration three important events had a profound impact on the course of US-Indian relations: the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, the rupee devaluation of 1966, and the "self-help/short-tether" agricultural aid policies of the Johnson administration. The gap between the US and India existed before Johnson became president in 1963 because the two nations had marked differences in the conceptions of their respective global roles. Pakistan attacked India in September 1965, precipitating the second Kashmir war. The conventional wisdom was that the Indian economy was hidebound in economic controls, that it had a bloated and inefficient public sector, and that there was neglect of Indian agriculture.
