ABSTRACT
Norman Schwarzkopf's campaign did not fully attain its goal: It neither prevented Iraqi troops from escaping across the Euph rates nor rendered the remaining escape routes totally impassable. After studying the Iraqi dictator's personality, the command could easily have foreseen that Saddam Hussein would put into effect his grim threats of terrorism and crimes against the environment. In an almost perfect performance of military technology, the forces executed President Bush's order to liberate Kuwait quickly and to crush the Iraqi military power. The performance of US, British, and French soldiers in the strategic operations demonstrated the height of military professionalism. Accordingly, the allies suppressed political impatience in favor of an assumed military time requirement. The "Cannae principle," which has been raised to a doctrine since the times of German Field Marshal von Schlieffen and which is taught at some military schools, must no longer be an absolute maxim for modem armed forces.
