ABSTRACT
Soviet “concerns” are of course subjective and very much culturally determined, not a fit subject for a non-Sovietologist who must limit himself to the interpretation of military externalities. Despite the change in mentality that nuclear weapons eventually induced, Soviet military policy remained essentially pre-nuclear not only after Hiroshima but even as the Soviet Union itself acquired its first nuclear weapons. The new strategic conditions sharply reduced the military value of Eastern European territory. In theory, “Massive Retaliation” could have kept the Soviet Union and the United States in a state of extreme tension; in practice, it de-fused the military competition between them, by discounting the value of non-nuclear forces while justifying only modest “counter-city” nuclear forces on each side. The prospects of a Soviet military disengagement from Eastern Europe therefore depend on the willingness of the Kremlin leadership to sacrifice short/medium-term strategic gains for long-term economic gains.
