ABSTRACT
This chapter takes a fresh look at what might be required for Beijing and Taipei to sign a formal and sustainable peace accord – or, at a minimum, to find ways to forge constructive dialogue on the political question. The stakes are simply too high – and chance for armed conflict too real – to be complacent about the future. Disappointingly, this chapter’s research strongly suggests that Chinese president Xi Jinping’s decision to ‘move the goalposts’ on cross-Strait relations makes it highly unlikely that any sort of peace accord or even confidence-building measures (CBMs) towards initiating political negotiations are possible in the Strait. Xi’s decision to discard or at least downplay former Chinese President Hu Jintao’s emphasis on preventing Taiwanese independence and deferring reunification into the indefinite future, and instead to emphasize former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s ‘one country, two systems’ framework that envisions only one China, but with different governments, is simply a non-starter with Taiwan. And likewise, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus in the exact wording and with the exact meaning that Xi desires will only prolong the political stand-off. Nevertheless, there are elements of a peace deal that could significantly bolster the peaceful status quo and avoid potential calamity. However, maintaining the peace will probably require a bit of compromise on both sides and the use of CBMs to work up to political talks that have been deferred to another day.
