ABSTRACT
In “Durand and Suarez on Divine Causation,” Jacob Tuttle explores the accounts of Durand of Saint-Pourçain and Francisco Suárez. After discussing Durand’s reasons for holding what has been called “mere conservationism,” Tuttle explores Suarez’s criticisms of Durand’s position. Durand’s mere conservationism is similar to the positions of Auriol and Olivi that Frost discussed. In Durand’s view, God does not cooperate or concur in the causal interactions among creatures. Suárez presents a series of arguments against Durand’s account. According to the strongest of these arguments, mere conservationism is an inconsistent view. In traditional views of divine conservation, God’s production of a creature at the various times throughout its career is only conceptually distinct from his creation of that creature. But once this claim is granted, it is difficult to see how God is not also involved in the causal interactions among creatures. After all, when Michelangelo produces his statue David (for example), the statue is itself a contingent being that requires the exercise of God’s sustaining power as long as it exists. According to Suárez, then, by denying that God concurs in Michelangelo’s production of David, Durand commits himself to denying that God conserves David as long as it exists.
