ABSTRACT
In Chapter 7, Julia Jorati explores Leibniz’s view of divine causation. Leibniz, like practically all classical theists in his day, accepted versions of the view that creatures depend on God both for their continued existence and in their particular actions. More specifically, he held that divine conservation takes the form of continuous creation and that all creaturely actions require “special concurrence,” that is, a divine contribution that is tailored toward the specific creaturely action. Yet he vehemently rejected occasionalism, or the doctrine that God is the only productive or active cause of creaturely actions and that created things merely serve as occasions for divine activity. The challenge is whether Leibniz’s views are consistent. Initially, it may seem that these doctrines are riddled with an enormous number of problems. Some problems are internal to the two doctrines. For instance, it may appear difficult to account for a creature’s identity through time if it is literally re-created continuously. Likewise, it is hard to explain how precisely an action belongs to a creature rather than to God (or to both God and the creature) if God’s causal contribution is the way Leibniz describes it. This latter problem is, of course, particularly severe for sinful actions, which for theological reasons must not be attributed to God. In addition, there are arguments—formulated most famously by Malebranche—that anyone who accepts continuous creation must also accept occasionalism. After all, if God re-creates a creature at every instant, God seems solely responsible for any changes that this creature undergoes. For example, if the creature first sits and then stands, it is solely because God re-created it first in a sitting position and then in a standing position. Yet Jorati argues that Leibniz can solve all of these problems; his versions of the doctrines of divine conservation and divine concurrence are ultimately consistent.
