ABSTRACT
This chapter analyses the implementation process of Forest Right Act, 2006, at the state level, using ‘institutional choice and recognition’ framework for decentralisation reforms in the forestry sector,as advanced by Jesse Ribot and others (2006). Based on micro-level evidence in Maoist-affected districts of West Bengal, India, this chapter explores the reasons behind this ‘institutional choice and recognition’ by state. It also tries to examine the consequences of choosing and recognising a new institutional arrangement at the state level.
The chapter shows that the ‘bundle of forest rights’ under the Act has been reduced to only individual land titles on the ground, denying ‘community forest rights’ claims in governance of forest resources. It is argued that the state government treated individual land rights claims as another ‘beneficiary scheme’ of Panchayati Raj Institutions, with the intention of ‘political clientelism’ to secure votes in rural West Bengal’s electoral politics. It stresses that the role and interest of actors like the state – the implementing agency at the ground – in transferring power and authority, is vital under the federal structure of governance, particularly for devolution of natural resources governance – a source of immense wealth for the state.
