ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on the case of Poland, who has joined a growing number of countries plagued by democratic backsliding as opposition parties have failed to challenge the ruling party’s infringement on the rule of law. Opposition parties, though allowed to run in elections and present in the legislature, have been gradually shut out of any institutionalized forms of protest. Pundits, policy makers, and even scholars have been quick to blame this state of affairs on the weakness of formal institutions. This chapter takes a different view and argues that institutional features—such as agenda control and party discipline alongside legislative institutionalization—have been blocking the opposition from effectively influencing policy. Moreover, these majoritarian institutions that have shifted executive-legislative relations in the executive’s favor are not the doing of the new populist government, but have been in place for at least a decade. It is, therefore, too strong rather than not-strong-enough institutions—particularly those governing the executive—legislative relations—that have contributed to the recent phenomenon of democratic backsliding in this country.
