ABSTRACT
Both Aristotle’s EE and EN devote significant attention to the topic of the voluntary (τὸ ἐκούσιον; cf. EN III, chs. 1 and 5; EE II, chs. 6–9). Although these accounts share important core ideas, a number of divergences between them, of varying degrees of philosophical significance, have been pinpointed by scholars. In what follows, I want to focus on one particular divergence, namely the fact that the EN does, while the EE does not, tackle the question of whether states of character (ἕξεις) are voluntary. I shall start from the EN and show how the positive answer to that question is reached in the context of the Nicomachean account of voluntariness. I will then turn to the EE to show that, despite appearances, none of the relevant texts argues for a similar conclusion.
