ABSTRACT
For the ancient Chinese thinker Mòzǐ and his followers, social epistemology plays a crucial role in underwriting the legitimacy of political authority. The Mohists see a stable political society as achieved through a process they call “identifying upward,” by which the subjects of a state identify with unified norms of judgment and conduct promulgated by its leaders. These socially shared norms are imposed by political authority, but a leader can maintain political legitimacy only if the subjects of political authority genuinely endorse how the norms are implemented. Crucially, the Mohists hold that if those in authority and those they govern do not agree on the facts pertinent to observing and enforcing the norms, people may cease to identify upward, undermining social unity and defeating the justification for political authority. The doctrine of identifying upward thus assigns social epistemology a vital role in justifying or undermining the legitimacy of political authority. This chapter argues that the Mohists are probably mistaken in holding that consensus on norms can be achieved only through the exercise of political authority, but they may be justified in contending that the legitimacy of political authority can be sustained only if the institutions by which it is exercised embody shared norms and judgments.
