ABSTRACT
For more than two decades, researchers have documented striking individual differences in children’s understanding of others’ minds. The extension of research on theory of mind into middle childhood and adolescence provides a new opportunity to consider the nature, measurement, and consequences of individual differences in theory of mind. This chapter evaluates the claim that there are genuine (i.e., stable differences between children) and meaningful (i.e., with consequences for children’s social lives) individual differences in theory of mind in early and middle childhood. The chapter draws on three sources of evidence: (1) studies adopting theory of mind task batteries to investigate individual differences in children’s mindreading; (2) a new meta-analysis of 76 longitudinal studies of the rank-order stability of individual differences in theory of mind in early and middle childhood; and (3) longitudinal data examining the association between individual differences in theory of mind and social competence in middle childhood. The chapter builds on contemporary measurement theory to identify promising avenues for future research on the nature of individual differences in theory of mind.
