ABSTRACT
While formal causation is indispensable in explanations, its ontological commitments are still underresearched. This chapter develops a non-hylomorphic account of formal causation, which has the advantage of being ontologically less committed than hylomorphic accounts like Oderberg’s. In particular, it is independent (i) from disputes over universals, (ii) from hylomorphism, (iii) from individual forms, and (iv) from the status of biological kinds, social entities, etc. as real kinds. In addition, it allows for exceptions, making it applicable to exception-prone domains like biology (unlike the accounts of Ellis and of Bird). The paper shows that reference to the kind of a thing is ultimately indispensable in explanations, and that formal causes have explanatory, predictive, and causal roles similar to those usually ascribed to the laws of nature. The causal role is identified as a difference-making role backed by counterfactual and modal-existential dependence. The paper also deals with the epistemological side, and presents a procedure for identifying formal causes in exceptionless cases. For exceptions, an idea from Aristotle and default logic is applied. The formal cause should thus be acknowledged as a reputable type of explanation and causation.
