ABSTRACT
One of Owen Flanagan’s great recent contributions has been his work in comparative philosophy. Specifically, his provocative book, The Bodhisattva’s Brain: Buddhism Naturalized (2011) and before that, The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World (2007), opened conversations between analytic philosophers and scholars interested in Buddhism. In The Bodhisattva’s Brain, Flanagan argues that Buddhism can be understood as a kind of virtue eudaimonism. In the spirit of this enterprise, Snow offers a comparison and contrast between key Aristotelian and Buddhist metaphysical and ethical concepts. This exercise yields several pay-offs. First, for each view, we reach a deeper understanding of the extent to which virtues and eudaimonia are influenced by metaphysical presuppositions. Second, we gain a better grasp of the purpose of the virtues within each view, of what work they are meant to do for the agent, what they are supposed to help her attain, and why. Third, we’re afforded some insight into how different conceptions of eudaimonia can shape a life, and affect how we see ourselves and others. Finally, we get a sense of where different theorists think moral pitfalls lie, and how we can best indemnify ourselves against them.
