ABSTRACT
Spinoza’s philosophy revolves around a basic set of concepts that he regards as denoting some kind of activity: striving, power, virtue, freedom, and perfection, among others. According to a standard view, these kinds of activity are equivalent or, at least, coextensive. In contrast, my thesis is that Spinoza employs two basic notions of activity: striving and being an adequate cause. While these notions are related, they are not equivalent or coextensive because a thing can strive without being an adequate cause – in other words, the sole cause – of an effect. I examine two consequences of this thesis. First, attending to this distinction shows that Spinoza understands the activity of virtue, perfection, and human freedom as striving, rather than being an adequate cause. Second, attending to the distinction broadens our understanding of Spinoza’s conception of activity. Things can be active while also being causally dependent since Spinoza holds that things strive when they are passively affected. Thus, activity and passivity, for Spinoza, are not mutually exclusive. Both of these consequences highlight that Spinoza’s ethics leaves an important positive role for human dependence, passivity, and cooperation in the activity of a good life.
