ABSTRACT
The aim of this chapter is to outline a theory of human action that finds textual support in the Ethics and is sufficient for Spinoza’s ethical theory. The theory is based on Spinoza’s explanation of “the origin and nature of the affects,” the topic of the long middle part of the Ethics. The chapter explicates Spinoza’s multidimensional analysis of the affects in terms of their cognitive, motivational, and evaluative properties, and shows how this analysis intersects with an account of practical reason. Two principal claims are that these resources allow for a positive account of an agent’s decision to act that can be distinguished from Spinoza’s well-known critique of freedom of the will and that his theory of action is sufficient to capture familiar scenarios involving the conflict between reason and appetite. While stopping short of a full-blown defense of Spinoza’s theory of action as adequate for his ethics, the chapter suggests some of the ways in which the former is able to meet the demands of the latter.
