ABSTRACT
Skepticism is the thesis that we have little knowledge or even no knowledge at all. The majority of epistemologists consider this to be false (often obviously, or even trivially, so).
Skepticism denies the ordinary epistemic appearance that we have lots of knowledge and seems to imply that ordinary knowledge-based assertion and practical reasoning are impossible (or at least rarely possible). Accordingly, most epistemologists develop theories of knowledge that are anti-skeptical and purport to show that skepticism is mistaken (e.g. contextualism, Moorean invariantism and subject-sensitive invariantism).
More recently, however, some skepticism-friendly voices have been exploring the possibility of various skeptical positions (some more moderate, some more radical). Exploring the possibility that skepticism (in some form or other) better explains various epistemic desiderata and empirical data and that the supposedly devastating problems of skepticism (e.g. for assertion and practical reasoning) can be lessened, or even avoided entirely.
This volume aims to advance the current state of the debate about both radical and moderate skepticism and calls for a reconsideration of skepticism as a family of theories in mainstream epistemology. Skepticism is a perennial theme in philosophy, but with this volume, we hope to rekindle a genuine debate about its plausibility.
