To avoid skepticism, many contemporary epistemologists endorse a fallibilist view of knowledge. But fallibilism does not necessarily escape skepticism. A theory might be fallibilist while still espousing standards too demanding to be regularly met.

This might seem like a puzzling combination of ideas. In contemporary epistemology, fallibilism and skepticism are often depicted as opposing views: we embrace fallibilism to escape skepticism, and to deny fallibilism is to risk skepticism. However, fallibilism alone does not guarantee that most of our ordinary knowledge claims are true. In this chapter, I will defend a version of skepticism that is compatible with fallibilism and supported by recent work in psychology. In particular, I will argue that we often cannot properly trust our ability to rationally evaluate reasons, arguments, and evidence (a fundamental knowledge-seeking faculty). We humans are just too cognitively impaired to achieve even fallible knowledge, at least for many beliefs.