ABSTRACT
States are developing technologies to combat cyberthreats but the dilemma remains in balancing human rights and national security. Public consensus was based on how the securitizing agent propagated cyberspace as a threat to “national security and identity” in media and policy. To combat this threat state sovereignty is extended to cyberspace (cybercontrol) whereby the 2018 Anti-Cybercrime Law (ACL), equates vaguely defined cyber-“crimes” to “state security” threats. This chapter analyses Egypt’s cyberpolicy and the ACL, and examines the different online surveillance tools and policing measures. In light of the flawed governance apparent in drafting the ACL, the main question is what are the implications of excessive cyberspace securitization on digital rights and democracy? Sovereignty as a cybersecurity concern was introduced in the “Arab Convention on Information Technology Offences.” Protesters who raided the SSI building in March 2011 were able to disclose meeting minutes on tenders for Internet circumvention tools and spyware.
