ABSTRACT
This chapter describes some political and operational scenarios which can exemplify the conditions under which the United Nations had to operate in the former Yugoslavia. Over the decades since the United Nations first deployed military units in a peacekeeping mission – UN Emergency Force in 1956 – the lessons learned have been distilled into three basic principles for UN peacekeeping. These include: Consent by participants in the conflict; impartiality by peacekeepers; and use of force by peacekeepers in self-defence only. Since the end of the Cold War, Peacekeeping Operations have been extended tremendously and have been affected by exaggerated and often unfulfilled expectations. Two major aspects of realism are often confused with one another or their interdependency is not adequately recognized: operational and political realism. Limits on UN peacekeeping operations are also set by a further factor which is likewise political in nature: reluctance to accept the risk of casualties.
