ABSTRACT
This essay considers humor as a moral virtue, understanding virtue along broadly Aristotelian lines. Is there a virtue of humor? If so, what is its profile, and how does it matter for living well? I begin with a basic sketch of humor. I then consider a series of objections to the idea that humor could be a virtue. These objections reveal the need for an account of humor’s distinctive role in a well-lived life. For such an account, I turn to the Aristotelian-Thomistic view that humor is a kind of play. This view provides insight into the value of humor but also faces an objection: Isn’t humor often morally serious rather than mere play? To address this objection, I show how much humor is best seen as a kind of moral interpretation that is simultaneously serious and playful. The notion of serious play helps us understand better what the virtue of humor looks like and why it is indeed a virtue. In the final section, I consider the particular case of laughing at one’s own shortcomings and why the person who takes life seriously might have special need for the virtue of humor.
