ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses various attempts at deriving metaethical conclusions from claims about the function of morality. Claims about the function of morality can be used to support a variety of specific metaethical theses and positions. Nevertheless, the views of those who appeal to such claims are typically aligned with one of two broader projects. The first of these projects is to debunk morality, or at least a conception of morality according to which morality is a domain in which truth and knowledge can and should be sought. The second project that might be pursued by those who appeal to the metaethical significance of function claims is to vindicate morality. The aim of those pursuing the vindicating project is the opposite of the debunker’s aim. Philip Pettit also argues for a naturalist realism about morality, that is, for the view that our moral concepts refer to properties that are unproblematic from a naturalistic point of view.
