ABSTRACT
While naval warfare has occupied a prominent place in the history of conflict and diplomacy, it tended to be waged between states with strikingly different political, economic and strategic views of the sea in national strategy. Sea power states tended to share inclusive political structures that enable trade, capital and commerce access to the levers of power. That access was used to promote naval power and identity. They fought for sea control and economic advantage, while continental powers sought security and additional profitable territory. Continental navies were primarily used to limit the ability of sea powers to exploit the ocean. Since, as maritime strategist Julian Corbett observed in 1911: ‘men live upon the land and not upon the sea,’ it has always been easier to secure a strategic decision ashore than at sea. However skilfully handled, naval power has exerted enormous influence on conflicts as varied as the Napoleonic wars and the Falklands conflict of 1982.
