ABSTRACT
The chapter examines the 12 March 1971 ‘coup by memorandum’ in relation to the Colonels’ coup in Greece and the 1960 military takeover in Turkey. In the Turkish case of 1971, there were no tanks in the streets and the decision not to effect a full-blown military takeover was informed by the experience of the Greek junta. Evidently, the Turkish military recognized that a direct military dictatorship might prompt liberal critics to draw uncomfortable parallels with the Greek dictatorship. This also raises the question of how it was possible to take over power with a minimum use of force. The answers are sought in the May 1960 Turkish coup which outlawed the ruling Democrat Party, introduced a new constitution and had three of the former leading politicians hanged, including Prime Minister Menderes. The hypothesis is that the politicians dreaded suffering the same fate as their Democrat colleagues. In turn, the 1971 putschists feared that the establishment of direct military rule might reproduce the same kind of divisions in the Turkish armed forces that had marred the period of the formal military regime of 1960 to 1961, as well as the early period of transition from military rule to civilian government in the first half of the 1960s.
