ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on the case that the postreform environment in China was, by 1989, one in which disintegrative forms of corruption had increased relative to other varieties. Corruption defined as any cadre behavior that violates laws, rules, or official norms against the pursuit of "private" benefit. A convergence of political-cultural and structural factors acted to reinforce the disintegrative effects of corruption and extend them to the political system as a whole. Disintegrative corruption engendered increasing disaffection among the populace with the system and at the same time rendered the regime incapable of timely, effective response. The situation that pertained in Urban China after the onset of reforms in many ways came to resemble what Johnston terms "crisis corruption". The cadre appointment system in China corresponded to the nomenklatura system in the Soviet Union. It created the foundation for a build-up of clientelist relationships. The Chinese system endorses personal recommendation as the best method for filling organizational positions.
